A BEJEAP Contributions article.

Abstract

In spite of the negligible probability that everyone has to cast a decisive vote, political information can be relevant for a number of private decisions. Under quite mild assumptions, the demand for information is increasing in income. Being informed affects responsiveness to electoral platforms and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account in their optimization process. As a consequence, redistribution is generally lower than what the median voter theorem predicts. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature takes for granted, an increase in inequality does not unambiguously increase redistribution. This is consistent with most empirical research in this field. Finally, an increase in the cost of information induces a reduction in redistribution.

Submitted: September 28, 2004 · Accepted: November 28, 2004 · Published: June 12, 2005

Originally published in Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Larcinese, Valentino (2005) "Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol4/iss1/art4