The Pollution Haven Hypothesis

Introduction

This special issue is edited by Don Fullerton of the University of Texas and refereed as any other issue of our journals. Do polluter location decisions respond to pollution policies, and do jurisdictions adopt weak environmental regulations to attract industry and jobs? Does trade liberalization affect the incentives of governments to regulate dirty industries? How does the analysis of trade and trade policy vary if pollution is local, regional, or global, and how should regional and global institutions respond? These are just some of the questions addressed in this special issue. A print copy of this material is now available. For details, please see this page.

Additional articles for the "The Pollution Haven Hypothesis" issue are listed in the Contributions tier, also included below.

Advances

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The Unintended Disincentive in the Clean Air Act
John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet, and Warren McHone

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Managed Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Local Pollution
Pierre M. Regibeau and Alberto Gallegos

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Trade Liberalization and Pollution Havens
Josh Ederington, Arik Levinson, and Jenny Minier

The following "The Pollution Haven Hypothesis" content is from Vol. 3, Iss. 2 of Contributions.

Contributions

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Cross-Country Policy Harmonization with Rent-Seeking
Patrik T. Hultberg and Edward B. Barbier

 
 
 

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