Abstract

In this study we advance the current research on corporate political strategy by examining how firms decide on their level of engagement in political action. This study proposes a contingency approach that identifies conditions in which firms prefer individual action to collective action in their pursuit of political strategy and introduces a framework that addresses this preference. Our results show that even in concentrated industries, a firm's preference of individual action over collective action varies when government contracts or research and development intensity are important considerations.

Recommended Citation

Ozer, Mine and Lee, Seung-Hyun (2009) "When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration," Business and Politics: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1, Article 4.
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1234
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol11/iss1/art4